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SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSION GROUP REPORT
WORKING TOWARDS FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES: A REPORT
Kerry L. Macintosht
Over the course of two days, the participants in our discussion
group grappled with the privacy implications of Intelligent Vehicle
Highway Systems (IVHS). Our views were diverse and often strongly
held; many discussions were highly emotional, and unanimity was
rarely achieved. Accordingly, this report does not attempt to capture
the full richness and detail of our discussions, but seeks merely to state
some tentative conclusions. we reached about the relationship of IVHS
to privacy, and the need for fair information practices that could pro-
tect privacy without unduly restricting the efficacy of IVHS
technology.
A. CONCERNS
Following extensive discussions regarding privacy and its rela-
tionship to IVHS, we concluded that much IVHS data would not con-
cem identifiable individuals, and therefore would not prejudice
privacy interests. However, IVHS does have the potential to collect at
least some personally-referable data, thereby infringing upon privacy
interests. Moreover, several of us found Professor Reiman's analogy
of the Panopticon compelling. The potential for integration of IVHS
data with the vast amount of data already being collected by govern-
mental agencies and private entities heightened our privacy concerns.
Some participants disagreed, strongly urging that the collection
and retention of even individualized information about acts committed
in public would not infringe upon recognized privacy rights. These
same participants tended to view concerns about the development of a
menacing Panopticon as speculative and overblown.
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B. SUGGESTIONS
Our sessions quickly revealed that there were no simple ways to
assuage the deeply felt concerns that many participants expressed re-
garding the impact of IVHS upon privacy.' Indeed, many of our dis-
cussions involved critique of our own proposed solutions.
Nevertheless, most of us agreed that privacy protections should be put
into place now-before IVHS is fully implemented, and before gov-
ernmental and private entities become accustomed to having free ac-
cess to IVHS data. Accordingly, we concluded that the best solution
to privacy concerns in the IVHS arena was the implementation of the
following fair information practices.
1. Privacy Impact Statement: Before IVHS technology is im-
plemented, a "Privacy Impact Statement," similar to the Environmen-
tal Impact Statements already required under federal law, should be
prepared.
2. Data creation and retention: We generally agreed that those
who implement IVHS should be careful about the ways in which data
is created. Use of "smart cards" and similarly anonymous devices
could help us avoid the unnecessary creation of personally intrusive
data.
To the extent that IVHS technologies require the creation of at
least some personally-referable data, many of us concluded that such
data should be destroyed once traffic management objectives have
been achieved. However, at least one participant noted that persons
involved in commercial vehicle operations (CVO) may need such data
in order to comply with otherwise burdensome regulatory duties, such
as collecting taxes from truckers on behalf of various governments.
3. Restrict access to data: Many participants concluded that
privacy could and should be protected by restricting access to IVHS
data to those with legitimate traffic management purposes.
Generally, we recognized that law enforcement agencies and per-
sonnel would often have a legitimate need for access to IVHS data;
however, vigorous debate could not resolve our differences regarding
the conditions of such access. Some would allow law enforcement
unrestricted access to the data, whereas others insisted that a court
order or subpoena should be obtained first.
1. One participant questioned the assumption that the implementation of IVHS was nec-
essary; in her view, we should first decide whether the goal of improved traffic management was
important enough to outweigh the risks posed to privacy interests.
However, the majority of participants felt that the implementation of IVHS was already a
"done deal" and that our best strategy was to make sure that appropriate protections were
adopted now, before the technology progressed any further.
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Beyond these broad propositions, we could not reach agreement
regarding access to IVHS data. One participant argued that private
companies needed access to commercial vehicle operations data for
legitimate business reasons unrelated to traffic management purposes.
Another member of our group unleashed a firestorm of protest by sug-
gesting that, given public resistance to taxes, governments might seek
to fund IVHS by selling personally-referable data to private entities
for use in marketing. The vehemence of this particular discussion
suggests that the need for funding, and the source of funding, could
become a major stumbling block to the implementation of IVHS. Per-
haps, as yet another person suggested, the solution lies in designing
IVHS services that are so desirable -not to mention respectful of
privacy-that individuals and companies are willing to pay for them.
4. Ensuring accuracy of data: Recognizing the potential for
harm to individuals who are falsely identified through IVHS data, we
agreed every effort should be made to ensure that only accurate data
be collected, retained, and released.
5. Disclosure and informed consent: We also reasoned that
system users should be fully informed about IVHS capabilities and
policies regarding the collection, retention, and release of data. Such
disclosure could protect privacy by giving individuals the opportunity
to give their informed consent to IVHS participation.
Some participants urged that IVHS should be designed to permit
maximum freedom of individual choice, thereby providing a systemic
solution to privacy concerns that ultimately would be more effective
than legal regulation and sanctions. Freedom of choice would benefit
not only those who value privacy, but also those who value the right to
choose IVHS. One participant emphasized that the right to choose
IVHS was particularly important in the commercial vehicle operations
context, where IVHS technology has become an essential means of
allowing companies to compete on an international basis.
However, several other participants expressed a deep skepticism
about the efficacy of choice or consent as a means of privacy protec-
tion. These participants noted that most IVHS technologies could
quickly become universal in their application, leaving the individual
no choice but to participate and "consent." Indeed, one participant
expressed concern that nonparticipation in IVHS would itself become
information, and be used to infer guilt rather than legitimate exercise
of privacy rights.
Even so, most of us agreed that providing the public with infor-
mation regarding IVHS objectives and capabilities was worthwhile.
Disclosure could actually facilitate implementation of IVHS technol-
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ogy, both by allaying unfounded fears about privacy invasion, and by
enabling private industries to design products that provide the mix of
privacy and traffic management services that consumers actually pre-
fer. In extreme cases, a well-informed public could have the power to
reject IVHS applications viewed as unduly oppressive.
6. Sanctions: Finally, we recognized that fair information prac-
tices could serve to protect privacy only so long as they were consist-
ently observed. Accordingly, criminal sanctions and civil liability
should be imposed for unsanctioned use of IVHS data. Such sanctions
and liability could help create a culture of compliance with fair infor-
mation practices.
These solutions that we have proposed-at the end of only two
days of discussion-are broadly stated, and undoubtedly underinclu-
sive. While we have not yet, and may never, achieve perfect solu-
tions, most members of our group would probably agree that our
discussions were a valuable means of exploring our differing views
towards privacy, and the impact that IVHS is likely to have upon
privacy.
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